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Apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax-Should
North Carolina Adopt An Apportionment Statute?
There is an old saying that only two things are certain-death
and taxes. After the first has occurred, the problem of the second
arises by virtue of the federal estate tax requirements of the Internal
Revenue Code.1 Since the federal government exacts payment for a
person's privilege of transferring his assets at his death, the problem
arises as to who will bear this burden and how it will be proportioned.
It is important to recognize that in every jurisdiction a testator may
determine the allocation of the federal estate tax burden by an appro-
priate provision in his will.2 Nevertheless, many individuals die intes-
tate, and wills prepared with or without3 a lawyer's assistance may
not include adequate provisions for the allocation of the tax.4 Thus a
statutory solution, which is within the control of each state legisla-
ture,0 is needed to ensure the preservation of the decedent's plan for
the distribution of his assets.
This comment is designed to encourage North Carolina to
change its current policy towards the allocation of the federal estate
tax' and to give North Carolina lawyers and legislators a better un-
derstanding of the various choices available and the problems with
each. The latter portion of this comment is devoted to a proposed
statute, which, if adopted, would bring North Carolina in line with
the method of determining the tax burden adopted by a majority of
the states.
1. INT. REV. CODE Op 1954, §§ 2001-209.
2. Powell, Ultimate Liability for Federal Estate Taxes, 1958 WAsH. U.L.Q. 327,
328.
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.2(2) (1966) allows holographic wills to be probated.
4. Sheffield, Notes on Equitable Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes-A
Consideration of the New York Statute, 19 CoNN. BJ. 6, 15 (1945).
5. As explained by the Supreme Court: "[C]ongress intended that the federal es-
tate tax should be paid out of the estate as a whole, and that the applicable state law
as to the devolution of property at death should govern the distribution of the remain-
der and the ultimate impact of the federal tax ... .." Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S.
95, 97-98 (1942).
6. Length limitations prevent a detailed examination of the numerous policy fac-
tors involved in this area, and the reader is invited to examine the numerous authorities
cited herein for further investigation. Many of the pre-1955 articles concerning this
subject are listed in Scoles, Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes and Conflict of
Laws, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 261, 264 n.10 (1955).
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I. TaY EVOLUTION OF THE APPORTIONMENT DOCTRINE
The present federal estate tax had its beginning in 1916 although
death taxes imposed by the federal government had been adopted and
abandoned several times before then.7  The death tax imposed in 1916
was an "estate" tax levied upon a decedent's right to transfer his
property at his death." Thus the new federal tax varied in its funda-
mental purpose from the "inheritance" taxes imposed by some states9
on a beneficiary's right to receive property transferred by the dece-
dent. This distinction was expressly recognized by the United States
Supreme Court in YMCA v. Davis.'0
When first faced with the question of who should ultimately pay
the new federal tax, state courts logically classified the tax as an ad-
ministration expense and required it to be paid out of the residue of
the estate.:" Moreover, since the new federal act required payment
of the tax by the executor,12 it was thought that congressional intent
mandated payment from the residuary estate.'3 Thus most courts
adopted what is frequently called the "burden on the residue" rule. 4
This allocation created no great financial problem so long as the tax
rate remained low. But as Congress began increasing the impact of
the tax, the problem of who bore the burden increased proportion-
7. An interesting discussion of the history of the federal death taxes appears in
Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAx L REv. 223, 223-36
(1956).
8. Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95, 98 (1942).
9. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-2 (1972).
10. 264 U.S. 47 (1924). The Court stated: "What was being imposed here was
an excise upon the transfer of an estate upon death of the owner. It was not a tax
upon sucession and receipts of benefits under the law or the will. What this law
taxes is not the interest to which the legatees and devisees succeeded on death, but
the interest which ceased by reason of the death." Id. at 50.
11. See Lauritzen, Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes, 1 Tx COUNSELOR'S
Q., June 1957, at 55, 62.
12. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2002.
13. Lauritzen, supra note 11, at 62-63; see, e.g., Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust
Co., 233 Mass. 471, 475-76, 124 N.E. 265, 267 (1919); In re Hamlin, 226 N.Y. 407,
410-16, 124 N.E. 4, 6-7, cert. denied, 250 U.S. 672 (1919).
14. See, e.g., Brown's Estate v. Hoge, 198 Iowa 373, 199 N.W. 320 (1924);
Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co., 233 Mass. 471, 124 N.E. 265 (1919); In re Hamlin,
226 N.Y. 407, 124 N.E. 4, cert. denied, 250 U.S. 672 (1919).
However, courts in Florida, Georgia and Kentucky refused to follow the residue
rule and apportioned the federal tax burden. See Henderson v. Usher, 125 Fla. 709,
170 So. 846 (1936); Regents of Univ. System v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 194 Ga. 255,
21 S.E.2d 691 (1942); Hampton's Adm'rs v. Hampton, 188 Ky. 199, 221 S.W. 496
(1920); Sutter, Apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax in the Absence of Statute
or an Expression of Intention, 51 MicH. L. REv. 53, 58 (1952).
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Two major undesirable consequences of the "burden on the resi-
due" rule soon arose, both of which are currently problems in North
Carolina. First, when the residuary estate was forced to bear this in-
creased tax burden, a testator's otherwise well-conceived plan for the
distribution of his property might be completely destroyed. 6 As one
writer has observed, "the residuary estate usually is intended for
the enjoyment of beneficiaries who are the nearest next of kin of the
decedent.""' If a testator made several large specific bequests to
friends or relatives while leaving the residue to his wife and children,
it was possible that the latter would be left with little or nothing after
the tax was paid.' 8  The same result followed when a sizable non-pro-
bate asset' 9 was included in the taxable estate since the corresponding
increase in the tax burden was borne by the residuary estate.2" The
second unfortunate consequence of the residue rule was that a large
tax burden was often placed on property which would otherwise qual-
ify for a marital or charitable deduction. Under these circumstances
the tax burden was actually increased. 2 ' This result would rarely
seem to be the testator's intention.
Recognizing the undesirable consequences which might result
from the application of the "burden on the residue" rule,2" New York
15. Cf. Gump, Apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax, 6 MD. L. REv. 195
(1942).
16. See J. FAna, AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK § 45H, at 271 (3d ed. 1966).
17. Polisher, Proration of Federal Estate Tax Among Life Insurance Benefici-
aries, 50 Dicn,. L. RFv. 1, 2 (1945).
18. See J. "1cMA, ESTATE PLANNIN G 63 (rev. ed. 1968).
19. The various types of non-probate assets that may be included in the taxable
estate are set out in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954: dower or curtesy interests (§
2034); transactions in contemplation of death (§ 2035); transfers with retained life
estate (§ 2036); transfers taking effect at death (§ 2037); revocable transfers (§
2038); annuities (§ 2039); joint interests (§ 2040); powers of appointment (§ 2041);
proceeds of life insurance (§ 2042); and transfers for insufficient consideration (§
2043).
20. A striking example of this possibility is found in It re Mellon's Estate, 347
Pa. 520, 32 A.2d 749 (1943). There the testator left a probate estate of over $11,-
000,000, but when certain non-testamentary assets were included in his taxable estate,
the tax bill came to over $37,000,000. Obviously, under the burden on the residue
rule, the probate assets would be completely exhausted to pay the tax.
Other examples of the inequitable consequences of the application of the residue
rule are presented in Lauritzen, supra note 11, at 55-57; Lindsay, Florida's Estate Tax
Laws-Apportionment Versus a Charge Against Residue, 12 U. FLA. L. REv. 50
(1959).
21. See text accompanying notes 101-02 infra.
22. The Decedent's Estate Commission of New York stated:
The principal objection to an estate tax has been that where the decedent
dies leaving a will, and makes no provision therein to the contrary, the entire
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became the first state to enact a statute" that apportioned the federal
estate tax burden among all beneficiaries pro rata.24  The United
States Supreme Court upheld the statute's constitutionality in Riggs v.
Del Drago.25 The Court observed that "[the] legislative history [of
the Revenue Act of 1916] indicates clearly that Congress did not con-
template that the Government would be interested in the distribution
of the estate after the tax was paid, and that Congress intended that
state law should determine the ultimate thrust of the tax."2
As clearly stated in Riggs, the allocation of the ultimate burden
of the federal estate tax is almost2r entirely within the control of the in-
dividual states. In arriving at a policy on allocation, states have de-
veloped three basic approaches: first, to place the entire burden of
the tax on the residuary estate; secondly, to allow apportionment of
the tax burden for non-probate assets, while retaining the residue
principle for assets comprising the probate estate;28 and finally, to al-
burden of the tax must be borne by the residuary legatee or legatees. Expe-
rience has demonstrated that in most estates the residuary legatees are the
widow, children, or nearer and more dependent relatives. . . . The burden
of the tax has been imposed upon the residuary legatees not only as to theproperty passing under the will, but also upon transfers whether by gift or
inter vivos trust, or other forms of transfer taking effect at death.
NEw YoRK COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE DEFECTS IN THE LAWS OF ESTATES, COM-
BINED REPORTS OF THE COMMISSION TO INvESIGATE DEFEaTS IN THE LAWS OF ESTATES
338 (reprinted. 1935).
23. Ch. 709, [1930] N.Y. Laws 1283-84 (now N.Y. EsT., PowERs & TRUSTS LAw§ 2-1.8 (McKinney 1967)); see Scoles & Stephens, The Proposed Uniform Estate Tax
Apportionment Act, 43 MINN. L. REv. 907, 915 (1959).
24. Pro rata apportionment means that each beneficiary pays the amount of tax
determined by the proportion that the value of his interest bears to the total value
of the taxable estate. For example, a recipient of a $10,000 bequest from the taxable
estate of $100,000 would pay 10% of the federal estate tax.
25. 317 U.S. 95 (1942).
26. Id. at 98. This position was later reaffirmed in Harrison v. Northern Trust
Co., 317 U.S. 476 (1943).
27. The Internal Revenue Code currently contains only two provisions dealing
with the question-one concerning life insurance proceeds and the other with powers
of appointment. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2206 stated:
Unless the decedent directs otherwise in his will, if any part of the gross
estate on which tax has been paid consists of proceeds of policies of insurance
on the life of the decedent receivable by a beneficiary other than the executor,
the executor shall be entitled to recover from such beneficiary such portion
of the total tax paid as the proceeds of such policies bear to the sum of the
taxable estate and the amount of the exemption allowed in computing the tax-
able estate ....
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2207 contains provisions similar to those of § 2206
concerning powers of appointment. See J. Bov, ESTATE PLANNING AND TAXATION §
3.40 (3d C.L.U. ed. 1972).
28. This would mean that non-probate assets such as life insurance proceeds andjointly held property would bear a pro rata share of the tax, while the residuary estate
would bear the tax burden for all property passing under the will.
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low apportionment as to all assets included in the taxable estate.2"
Although each of these possible choices has some following among the
states,30 a majority of the states that have addressed the subject adhere
to the total apportionment principle, and the trend is in that direc-
tion.31 Recognizing the desirability of uniform treatment throughout
the United States, a proposed Uniform Act advocating total appor-
tionment has been formulated. 2 States such as North Carolina,
which do not recognize the apportionment doctrine, should closely
examine the possibility of adopting such an approach. 'In order to
29. All assets, even those passing under the will, would bear their pro rata share
of the tax.
30. States applying the "burden on the residue" principle include: Alabama, ALA.
CODE tit. 51, § 449(1) (1958); Colorado, Ramsey v. Nordloh, 143 Colo. 526, 354 P.2d
513 (1960); District of Columbia, In re Estate of Collins, 269 F. Supp. 633 (D.D.C.
1967); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3401 (1961); Illinois, In re Estate of Phillips,
1 Ill. App. 3d 813, 275 N.E.2d 685 (1971); Iowa, IowA CODE ANte. § 633.449 (1964);
Kansas, Spurrier v. First Nat'l Bank, 207 Kan. 406, 485 P.2d 209 (1971); Maine, Old
Colony Trust Co. v. McGowan, 156 Me. 138, 163 A.2d 538 (1960); Mississippi, Miss.
CODE ANN. § 27-9-33 (1972); North Carolina, Park v. Carroll, 18 N.C. App. 53, 196
S.E.2d 40 (1973); Oklahoma, In re Rettemeyer's Estate, 345 P.2d 872 (Okla. 1959);
Texas, Sinnott v. Gidney, 159 Tex. 366, 322 S.W.2d 507 (1959) (at least as to probate
assets); Washington, In re Estate of Eberle, 4 Wash. App. 638, 484 P.2d 478 (1971);
Wisconsin, In re Uihlein's Will, 264 Wis. 362, 59 N.W.2d 641 (1953).
The following states apportion non-probate assets: Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §
734.041 (1964); Massachusetts, MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 65A, § 5 (1971); Missouri, Car-
penter v. Carpenter, 364 Mo. 782, 267 S.W.2d 632 (1954); Montana, In re Estate of
Marans, 143 Mont. 388, 390 P.2d 443 (1964); New Mexico, In re Gallagher's Will,
57 N.M. 112, 255 P.2d 317 (1953); Ohio, McDougall v. Central Nat'l Bank, 157 Ohio
St. 45, 104 N.E.2d 441 (1952); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-563 (Supp.
1971).
A majority of jurisdictions compel apportionment as to all assets: Alaska, ALASKA
STAT. § 13.16.610 (1972); Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 63-150 (1971); California,
CAL. PROB. CODE § 970 (West 1956); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-401(1972); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2901 (1953); Hawaii, HAWAII REv.
STAT. § 236A-2 (Supp. 1973); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 15-3-916 (Supp. 1973); Indiana,
IND. ANN. STAT. § 29-2-12-1 (Bums 1972); Kentucky, Gratz v. Hamilton, 309 S.W.2d
181 (Ky. 1958); Michigan, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (167.102) (Supp. 1973);
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.521 (1969); Nebraska, NEB. REv. STAT. §
77-2108 (1971); Nevada, NEv. REv. STAT. § 150.310 (1971); New Hampshire, N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 88-A:2 (1970); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:25-30 (1953);
New York, N.Y. Esr., PowERs & TnuSTS LAw § 2-1.8 (McKinney 1967); North Da-
kota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-21.1-02 (Supp. 1973); Oregon, ORE. REv. STAT. §
116.303 (1971); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3701 (Spec. Pamphlet 1972);
Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 44-23.1-2 (Supp. 1972); South Dakota, S.D.
COMNWLED LAWS ANN. § 29-7-71 (1967); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-1117(1955); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-161 (1973); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 44-2-16a (1966); Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 2-338 (Supp. 1973).
31. See Willoughby, Federal Estate Taxation-Testator's General Direction Against
Apportionment-Effect Upon Nonprobate Property, 46 Oa. L. REv. 199, 201-02
(1967).
32. UNnoRm ESTATE TAX ApPORTIONMENT ACT (1964 revision), reprinted in 9A
UNm oRm LAWS ANNOTATED 491-502 (1965).
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appreciate its benefits, it is necessary to understand the current status
of North Carolina law.
II. THE NORTH CAROLINA APPROACH
Since there is no North Carolina statute concerned with the allo-
cation of the federal estate tax, the state's position has been developed
exclusively through case law. The North Carolina decisions may
be divided into three separate groups: first, cases dealing with the sub-
ject in a general manner; secondly, cases concerned with the impact
of the marital deduction provisions of the Internal Revenue Code on
the problem; and finally, a case which enunciates the conflicts rule
which North Carolina apparently will follow in cases dealing with
the burden of the tax. Throughout all these cases, North Carolina,
in the absence of a will provision to the contrary, has never varied
from the application of the "burden on the residue" principle."'
A. Tax Allocation in General
The North Carolina Supreme Court first confronted the problem
of the allocation of the federal estate tax in Buffaloe v. Barnes.4 There
the court stated that:
The ruling of the trial judge that the Federal Estate tax
should be paid out of the general funds of the estate is affirmed.
Riggs v. Del Drago . . . . The general rule, in the absence of
contrary testamentary provision, is that the ultimate burden of an
estate tax falls on the residuary estate.35
The question of the tax burden appears to have been only a minor is-
sue in that case, and the court made no attempt to discuss the policies
and consequences of placing the entire burden on the residuary estate.8 0
Yet the court has steadfastly relied on this one paragraph holding de-
spite a subsequent nation-wide trend towards a more equitable solu-
tion of the problem.3 7 Only four years after Buffaloe the court was
33. 1 N. WIGGINS, WILus AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN NORTH CAROLINA
§ 156 (1964); cf. Note, Federal Estate Tax-Marital Deduction-Apportionment, 31
N.C.L. Rav. 491, 498 (1953).
34. 226 N.C. 313, 38 S.E.2d 222 (1946).
35. Id. at 332, 38 S.E.2d at 228-29. It is ironic that Buffaloc cites the Riggs
decision in adopting the "burden on the residue" rule, since Riggs is considered the
most prominent decision in the evolution of the apportionment doctrine. See text ac-
companying notes 25-26 supra.
36. The Buffaloe decision falls squarely within an observation made by Sutter,
supra note 14, at 70: "Mhe recent decisions denying apportionment have done so
largely on a citation of the 'majority rule,' whereas those requiring apportionment have
set forth reasons at some length."
37. See authorities cited noted 30 supra.
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once again confronted with the tax problem in Craig v. Craig.38 In
a per curiam opinion the court upheld the trial court's ruling that the
entire burden of the federal estate tax was chargeable to the residuary
estate without reimbursement from any beneficiary for his proportion-
ate share .3  Again, there was no discussion of the problems in-
volved.
In 1963 in Cornwell v. Huffman ° the court was confronted with
the allocation of the federal estate tax due from an estate containing a
large trust, the assets of which passed to the beneficiaries outside the
will. The decedent had specified in her will that the residuary estate
was liable for all estate taxes due from probate property but that any
taxes due on account of property passing outside the will were to be
paid from the trust. The court was asked to determine which assets
should bear the estate tax burden and how that burden should be
proportioned. Instead of relying on the specific will provision, the
court emphasized the equities of the situation:
[We have no statute which is controlling in the present factual
situation. We must, therefore, look to the equity of the situation
and apply rules previously announced in somewhat related cases.
The right of equitable contribution has been recognized and ap-
plied with respect to gift taxes.41
The court upheld the will provision and compelled the trust beneficiar-
ies to contribute to the payment of the tax.
Thus it appeared after Cornwell that the court might be willing
to apply the theory of equitable contribution to the payment of the fed-
eral estate tax, at least when both probate and non-probate assets
were involved. This theory appeared to gain support in 1966 when
the court, faced with a choice of law problem in First National Bank
v. Wells,42 stated:
[W]e deem it unnecessary to consider whether or not the
tax involved is apportionable under the decisions of this jurisdic-
tion. Even so, this Court has heretofore recognized and applied
the doctrine of equitable contribution with respect to gift taxes.
. .. This doctrine was cited with approval in Cornwell v. Huff-
man. .... 43
38. 232 N.C. 729, 62 S.E.2d 336 (1950).
39. Id. at 730, 62 S.E.2d at 336.
40. 258 N.C. 363, 128 S.E.2d 798 (1963).
41. Id. at 369, 128 S.E.2d at 802.
42. 267 N.C. 276, 148 S.E.2d 119 (1966).
43. Id. at 288, 148 S.E.2d at 127.
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However, the possibility that North Carolina was leaning toward
equitable apportionment for probate assets was eliminated recently in
Park v. Carroll.4 In that case the North Carolina Court of Appeals
refused to recognize any equitable contribution between the specific
and residuary beneficiaries in spite of a persuasive argument by ap-
pellants based on the language in Cornwell and Wells. 45 The question
of apportionment with respect to non-probate assets is still open, but
the Park court failed to mention any distinction between the two types
of property. 40
B. Tax Allocation In Connection With Marital Property
In 1948 Congress adopted a marital deduction provision which
granted to married couples in common-law jurisdictions the same estate
tax benefits previously enjoyed only by husbands and wives living in
community property states. The provision in effect allows up to fifty
percent of a deceased spouse's estate to pass tax free if left to the
surviving spouse in a manner prescribed by the statute.47  However,
only the amount which actually passes to the surviving spouse can
qualify for the deduction.48
The North Carolina Supreme Court first dealt with the impact of
the tax burden problem on the marital deduction in Wachovia Bank &
Trust Co. v. Green.40 In that case the testator's widow elected to dis-
sent from the will and thereby take her share as if the deceased had
died intestate.50  Since there was neither a living child nor a legal
44. 18 N.C. App. 53, 196 S.E.2d 40 (1973). The court simply stated that
"[nlo North Carolina decisions have applied the doctrine [equitable contribution] to
the apportionment of federal estate taxes." Id. at 59, 196 S.E.2d at 44.
45. Brief for Appellant at 9-10, Park v. Carroll, 18 N.C. App. 53, 196 S.E.2d
40 (1973).
46. It is unfortunate that persons concerned with estate planning and administra-
tion must speculate on what type of situation the court will find proper for equitable
contribution. As the court in Cornwell v. Huffman, 258 N.C. 363, 128 S.E.2d 798
(1963), stated: "Where the ultimate burden of paying estate taxes rests has been the
subject of much litigation. Results of course vary with the many differing factual situ-
ations. Where, as here, the taxable estate includes properties outside the probate estate,
there is lack of uniformity of decision." Id. at 368, 128 S.E.2d at 801. A legislative
enactment providing for the apportionment of estate taxes would constitute a uniform
rule which could be relied upon in any situation where the tax burden is a significant
factor.
47. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056.
48. See id. § 2056(a). This problem is discussed in text accompanying notes 100-
02 infra.
49. 236 N.C. 654, 73 S.E.2d 879 (1953).
50. N.C. GEr. STAT. § 30-3 (Supp. 1973).
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representative of a deceased child, the widow was entitled to one-
half of the estate.51 In view of the new marital deduction, there would
have been less federal tax if the widow had received her share free of
any estate tax burden.52 To the detriment of many surviving spouses
in North Carolina, the court held that since an intestate's property is
distributed after payment of debts58 and since "[t]he word 'debts'
...would seem to include the federal estate tax, 5 4 the dissenting wi-
dow's share must be computed after the payment of the tax.55 The
court also relied on the holdings in Buffaloe and Craig without any
attempt to distinguish them on the basis that no marital deduction
benefit was possible in those cases. The Green court also held that
since the widow had dissented from the will, she could not avail her-
self of any provision in the will directing how the estate tax was to be
paid. However, the court noted:
The public policy of the state is a matter for the legislative
branch of the government and not for the courts. Whether any
change should be made in the manner of distribution to the widow
of her interest in the estate of her husband, in view of the pro-
vision for marital deduction contained in the federal statute, is a
matter for the General Assembly. 56
The General Assembly was thus invited to enact legislation which
would provide married couples in North Carolina with the maximum tax
benefit allowed under the marital deduction provision of the Internal
Revenue Code. The General Assembly did act; the result, a proviso to
section 30-3(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes, was, however,
woefully inadequate-it affected only situations identical to that of
Green.57  As one writer has noted, the General Assembly actually added
51. Ch. 113, § 53(3), [1868] N.C. Pub. Laws 270-71 (repealed 1959).
52. Only the amount actually passing to the surviving spouse qualifies for the de-
duction. Since this amount is reduced to the extent of any tax paid, the amount of
deduction is reduced, thereby increasing the taxable estate. For further discussion see
text accompanying notes 101-04 infra.
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-105
54. 236 N.C. at 660, 73 S.E.2d at 883.
55. This view has not gained unanimous support. In Hammond v. Wheeler, 347
S.W.2d 884 (Mo. 1961), the court, after examining other cases on the question, stated:
[I]t seems ... to be inequitable and grossly unjust to require a surviving
spouse to pay a portion of the federal estate tax on the deceased spouse's es-
tate solely by reason of the fact that the surviving spouse receives a statutory
share of the estate which is not taxed and the receipt of which share does
not cause or contribute to cause any part of the tax ....
Id. at 893.
56. 236 N.C. at 659, 73 S.E.2d at 883.
57. N.C. GN. STAT. § 30-3(a) (Supp. 1973) states:
Upon dissent . . . the surviving spouse ... shall take the same share
of the deceased spouse's real and personal property as if the deceased had
1974]
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to the problem by enacting such narrowly drawn legislation. 8  De-
spite appeals that the scope of the legislation be expanded, 9 no fur-
ther action has been taken.
Two years after Green in Tolson v. Young60 the new proviso was
held not to apply to a dissenting spouse where there were children
of the testator by a former marriage. Justice Sharp, writing for the
court, gave the statute a literal interpretation and consequently the
small class of persons benefited was further limited."'
Even in situations not involving a surviving spouse's dissent from
a will, the decision in Green and the legislation which it produced
may affect the amount of the allowable marital deduction. In Adams
v. Adams62 the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's holding that a widow's one-half testamentary share of the
estate must pay one-half of the estate taxes. The court reasoned that
since the new legislation enacted after Green was confined solely to
the facts of that case, the Green rule applied to all other situations.
Although the devise and bequest to the widow was specific, and under
Buffaloe the tax burden falls on the residuary estate, the court found
that the will created no residuary estate, and consequently the widow's
share was liable for a part of the tax burden.
died intestate; provided, that if the deceased spouse is not survived by a
child, children, or any lineal decedents of a deceased child or children, or
by a parent, the surviving spouse shall receive only one half of the deceased
spouse's net estate . . . which one half shall be estimated and determined be-fore any federal estate tax is deducted or paid and shall be free and clear of
such tax.
(emphasis added.)
58. Kahn, The Federal Estate Tax Burden Borne By A Dissenting Widow, 64
MiCH. L. REv. 1499, 1520-21 (1966), states:
mhe presumption should be made in favor of maximizing the widow's share,
unless the legislature has indicated a contrary intent (such as was done by
...North Carolina), rather than to presume that the widow's share (and
the estate) should not benefit from the marital deduction unless the legislature
has affirmatively indicated that it desires that result.
59. 1 N. WiGGINs, supra note 33, § 160, at 532 states:
In light of the tax savings which are available to the surviving spouse
under the marital deduction provision of the federal estate tax law, considera-
tion should be given to the adoption of legislation which will provided [sic]
that in every instance the share of the surviving spouse will pass free of the
federal estate tax. In a majority of cases this would prove to be a greater
over-all benefit to the family of the decedent since it would result in less
taxes.
See Note, 31 N.C.L. Rnv. supra note 33, at 498; 42 N.C.L. Rav. 717, 717-18 (1964).
60. 260 N.C. 506, 133 S.E.2d 135 (1963).
61. First Union Nat'l Bank v. Melvin, 259 N.C. 255, 130 S.E.2d 387 (1963),
represents the only reported case where all the prerequisites of section 30-3(a) of the
General Statutes were met and the widow was allowed to take her statutory share free
of the federal tax burden.
62. 261 N.C. 342, 314 S.E.2d 633 (1964).
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Thus under current North Carolina law the only surviving spouse
who may take his share free of the federal estate tax burden is the one
who dissents from the will of a testator who had no surviving chil-
dren or other lineal decendents by any marriage and no parent sur-
viving him. In all other situations the spouse receiving property
through intestate succession or through dissent must bear a pro rata
share of the estate tax burden. If the spouse receives property
through the residuary clause of the will, he must bear the entire estate
tax payment-absent a will provision to the contrary. There is no ob-
vious reason why the General Assembly should continue such a pol-
icy.
C. Tax Allocation and North Carolina Conflicts Of Laws
The final aspect of the North Carolina approach to the allocation
of the estate tax burden concerns the question of the proper law to be
applied when a conflicts problem arises. In First National Bank v.
Wells6 the North Carolina Supreme Court considered the estate of
a Nevada resident who left property in trust to a North Carolina resi-
dent through a power of appointment. The court decided to apply
the Nevada estate tax apportionment act, which required the North
Carolina devisee to pay pro rata share of the estate tax levied on the
Nevada residents estate.64 If this choice of law principle is followed
in other jurisdictions,"6 North Carolina residents would be required
to pay a portion of the estate taxes if they receive property from a de-
cedent residing in an apportionment state, but foreign residents tak-
ing under a general or specific bequest or device in a North Carolina
resident's will would pay no tax. If North Carolina adopts an appor-
tionment policy, this inequity would be eliminated.
II. PROBLEMS IN FORMULATING AN APPORTIONMENT
STATUTE AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Although several states have adopted some type of apportion-
ment theory judicially, 66 the majority have effected this change through
63. 267 N.C. 276, 148 S.E.2d 119 (1966). This case is discussed in Wurfel,
Choice of Law Rules in North Carolina, 48 N.C.L. REv. 243, 291 (1970).
64. The court stated, "'When questions of apportionment of estate taxes arise in
courts of a state of the situs of a trust whose assets are includable in decedent's gross
estate for tax purposes, the law of the situs refers to the law of decedent's domicile
to resolve the questions."' 267 N.C. at 287, 148 S.E.2d at 126, quoting Doetsch v.
Doetsch, 312 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1963).
65. The conflicts prolems are discussed in text accompanying notes 82-88 infra.
66. See cases cited note 30 supra.
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legislation. 67  In spite of the fact that there are well-established equit-
able principles on which to base an apportionment doctrine,6 8 the
North Carolina judiciary has clearly indicated that it believes the legis-
lature must make the changes in this area.69 Therefore the following
discussion is presented on the assumption that a statutory provision
will be necessary.
A. Should Probate Assets Be Included?
A question which must be resolved at the outset is whether a
statutory apportionment of the tax burden should be applied to all
assets or only those passing outside the will (non-probate assets). Al-
though several writers have persuasively argued for the latter policy, 7
only a few states have statutorily adopted such an approach.71 The
argument for apportioning taxes only as to non-probate assets, while
requiring the residuary estate to pay the entire tax on the probate as-
sets, is based on the assumption that while the testator may not realize
that some assets will be included in his estate for tax purposes, he
nevertheless is aware of the property included in his will and the tax
consequences that will result from it.
It can be argued, however, that a testator having a will without a
tax clause simply did not consider the tax consequences of his estate
plan. In such a case it seems that the testator would desire that all
the beneficiaries pay their pro rata share of the tax.7 2 Consequently a
statute advocating total apportionment would appear preferable since
it would be less likely to do violence to the testator's testamentary
plan.
B. Contrary Will Provisions
Perhaps the major problem with an apportionment statute is
the question of how a testator may overcome its effects if he so de-
sires. In states with statutory apportionment over one-half of the dis-
67. See statutes cited note 30 supra.
68. See Fleming, Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes, 43 ILL. L. REV. 153,
156 (1948); Lauritzen, supra note 11, at 57-59.
69. See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Green, 236 N.C. 654, 659, 73 S.E.2d 879,
883 (1953), quoted in text accompanying note 56 supra.
70. See, e.g., Lindsay, supra note 20, at 70; Powell, supra note 2, at 336-38; Com-
ment, The Apportionment Doctrine-A Proposed Ohio Estate Tax Apportionment Stat-
ute, 41 U. GIN. L. REv. 897, 905-07 (1972).
71. See statutes cited note 30, supra.
72. Gump, supra note 15, at 203-04.
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putes have been concerned with a contrary will provision. 78  Al-
though the question of when a will provision preempts the statutory
directive is a serious one, the states still adhering to the "burden on
the residue" principle face a similar problem. In those states the
courts must decide when a will provision is effective to apportion the
tax.7 4  It is obvious that "there is no real substitute for good legal
draftsmanship clearly expressing a well-informed testator's inten-
tion.' '75 This maxim is relevant regardless of which position a state
maintains as to estate tax allocation.
States with apportionment statutes have established different re-
quirements for a testamentary direction sufficient to overcome appor-
tionment.76  New York requires a will provision "with certainty of ex-
pression," 77 and the New York statute states that the provision will
apply only to probate assets unless it states otherwise. 78  This posi-
tion has been criticized because it does not observe a testator's nor-
mal intention when he seeks to avoid apportionment-that no appor-
tionment be applied to any asset.79 This argument is even more per-
suasive when a testator's family is the recipient of the non-probate
assets.
Numerous writers have discussed this problem, and some have
formulated sample will provisions that would be effective to over-
come the operation of the statute when that is desirable.8 0 Neverthe-
73. Note, The Apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax in Pennsylvania, 54
Dic. L. REv. 432, 451 (1950); see Lauritzen, supra note 11, at 90; Sheffield, supra
note 4, at 12.
74. Suggestions for will clauses sufficient to overcome the residue rule are dis-
cussed in Kennon, Provision for Payment of Death Taxes, 27 N.C.L. REV. 94, 111-
12 (1948).
75. Fleming, supra note 68, at 164.
76. Comment, 41 U. CiN. L. REv. supra note 70, at 909.
77. In re Mills' Estate, 64 N.Y.S.2d 105 (N.Y. County Sur. Ct. 1946).
78. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.8(d) (McKinney 1967).
79. Willoughby, supra note 31, prefers the proposed Uniform Act, which does not
contain such a statutory presumption:
Allowing the general [will] direction to exonerate nonprobate as well as
probate assets is in accord with the deceased's probable expectation. More-
over, the proposed act is commensurate with the deceased's probable prefer-
ence to exonerate members of his family and other primary objects of his
bounty whether they receive probate or nonprobate property. Finally, it is
this writer's conclusion that a general direction to pay "all" estate taxes out
of the residuary estate or some other designated fund, where not qualified by
other words, is explicit enough to exonerate nonprobate assets from the bur-
den of such tax.
Id. at 210.
80. This problem is discussed in 2 A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 2014-16 (Supp.
1973); Mitnick, State Legislative Apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax, 10 MD.
L. REV. 289, 310-17 (1949); Note, Statutory Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes,
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less, a statute providing for this contingency should eliminate much of
the litigation which has arisen in other states.8' The problem of tax
allocation is most acute where there is no will provision at all, and the
method dealing most equitably with the beneficiaries in that situation
should be the one adopted as the "normally operative rule."
C. Conflict of Laws
As long as there is a split of authority on the allocation of the fed-
eral estate tax, there will be difficulties when estate administration
traverses state boundaries. If a decedent dies domiciled in an appor-
tionment state, leaving assets located in a residue jurisdiction to a
beneficiary also located in a residue jurisdiction, the personal repre-
sentative may be compelled to bring suit in the foreign state to collect
a portion of the tax. The problem is whether the forum should ap-
ply its own law or the law of the decedent's domicile.
New York established the rule that the law of the domicile should
be applied even though the result may be non-apportionment.8 2 This
position has been adopted in several other jurisdictions83 Neverthe-
less, where the assets include an inter vivos trust, both Massachusetts 4
and Minnesota88 have applied the law of the situs in deciding the tax
allocation question. The conflicts problems involved should be solved
by using the policies applicable in any conflicts situation-predicta-
bility and uniformity of result without regard to the choice of forum
and, in this particular area, a uniform treatment for all parts ot the
62 E-nv. L. REv. 1022, 1025-26 (1949); Note, Proposal for Apportionment of the Fed-
eral Estate Tax, 30 IND. L.J 217, 229 (1955); Note, The Minnesota Federal Estate
Tax Apportionment Statutes: Directing Against Its Application, 52 MINN. L. REv. 1288,
1298 (1968); see Annot, 37 A.L.R.2d 7 (1954).
Sample will provisions are found in Susman & Fourticq, Apportionment of Death
Taxes: A Comprehensive Survey with Proposed Statute, 45 TuXAs L. REv. 1348, 1357-
60 (1967).
81. See text accompanying note 127 infra.
82. See In re Peabody's Estate, 115 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sur. Ct. 1952); In re Gato's
Estate, 276 App. Div. 651, 97 N.Y.S.2d 171, aff'd, 301 N.Y. 653, 93 N.E.2d 924
(1950).
83. See, e.g., Doetsch v. Doetsch, 312 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1963) (Illinois); Trust
Co. v. Nichols, 62 N.J. Super. 495, 163 A.2d 205 (1960); In re Gallagher's Will, 57
N.M. 112, 255 P.2d 317 (1953).
Other articles discussing the conflicts problems are Scoles, Conflict of Laws in Es-
tate Planning, 9 U. FLA. L. REv. 398, 438-39 (1956); Note, Conflict of Laws in Estate
Tax Apportionment-The Inter Vivos Trust, 9 U. FLA. L. 1Ev. 194 (1956).
84. See Issacson v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 325 Mass. 469, 91 N.E.2d
334 (1950).




estate wherever situated. 6 This last policy demands application of
the law of a decedent's domicile, and it was the deciding factor in con-
vincing North Carolina to follow the New York rule, at least for inter
vivos trusts.
87
One writer, in an excellent and thorough discussion of the prob-
lem, has advocated that each state, regardless of its tax allocation posi-
tion, enact legislation providing that all assets of a nonresident de-
cedent be controlled by the tax allocation law of the decedent's domi-
cile.88  A simple federal conflicts statute would also solve the prob-
lem. But, barring these possibilities, it appears that the conflicts
problem will remain.
D. Allocation of Interest, Penalties, and Credits
A common mistake in drafting the early apportionment statutes
was "the failure to deal with the apportionment of interest and penal-
ties for deficiencies and late tax payments."89  The decisions under the
early New York statute adopted the theory that any penalty or interest
payments would be chargeable to the person whose conduct caused
them.90 If the statute is well drafted, however, there should be no
need for litigation over this question. The preferred approach appears
to be the apportionment of interest and penalties in the same manner
as the tax burden. This would provide an element of certainty and
would be equitable in the vast majority of cases. In a situation where
this method would lead to an unfair result, discretion should be given
to the judicial official having jurisdiction over the estate to allocate
this burden in the manner deemed most equitable to all concerned."
There are two ways to provide for this contingency, both equally
effective. One would be to state that "[a]ny interest resulting from
the late payment of the tax shall be apportioned in the same manner
86. Scoles, supra note 6, at 266-67.
87. First Nat'l Bank v. Wells, 267 N.C. 276, 287-88, 148 S.E.2d 119, 126-27
(1966).
88. Scoles, supra note 6, at 309, proposes the adoption of the following statute:
Estate or death taxes imposed by the United States by reason of the in-
clusion of real or personal property located or administered in this state in
the estate for tax purposes of a non-resident of this state shall be apportioned
among the persons interested in the estate to whom such property may be
transferred or to whom any benefit accrues only in accordance with the law
of the decedent's domicile applicable to property located therein.
89. Fleming, supra note 68, at 162.
90. Reidy, Apportionment of Estate Taxes, 88 TRUSTS & EsTA.TS 623, 628
(1949); see, e.g., In re Jamison's Estate, 64 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sur. Ct. 1946); In re Ryle's
Estate, 170 Misc. 450, 10 N.Y.S.2d 597 (Sur. Ct. 1939).
91. See text accompanying note 129 infra,
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as the tax and shall be charged wholly to principal." 2  The other
would be to include interest and penalties in the basic statutory defi-
nition of "tax."93  Either method would preclude the necessity of
litigation to settle the question.
The proper allocation of the various credits allowed by the Inter-
nal Revenue Code94 is another problem which should be provided
for in the statute. The Uniform Act allows the credit for any state
death tax paid to inure to the benefit of the beneficiaries chargeable
with the payment of the tax95 and allocates other credits to the benefit
of the whole estate. 96 It has been suggested that if a donee is
charged with the payment of the gift tax, some provision should be
made allowing him to benefit directly. 97
Regardless of how interest, penalties, and credits are treated, it is
essential that they be expressly provided for in the statute to avoid
needless litigation. 98
E. Property Qualifying For A Deduction Under The Federal Estate
Tax Laws
In formulating any apportionment statute, provision must be
made for property which is not subject to a tax because of a deduction
or exemption given to it." The basic purpose of an apportionment
statute should be to require all beneficiaries to contribute to the tax
burden in proportion to the amount of tax resulting from the prop-
erty they receive. In the case of property qualifying for the marital or
charitable deduction, the tax burden is not increased, and therefore
this property should not be liable for the payment of any tax.100
In addition to being the most equitable result, the exoneration
of these interests will usually decrease the total amount of tax due, for
only the value of the assets actually passing to the recipient can qual-
92. N.Y. EST., Powmis & TRusTs LAw § 2-1.8(c)(4) (McKinney 1967).
93. This seems to be the simplest solution to the problem and is the one adopted
by the Uniform Act and this writer. See text accompanying note 122 infra.
94. INT. REv. CoD oF 1954, §§ 2011-16.
95. UNIFoRM ETATE TAX ApPORmoNmNT AcT § 5(d), supra note 32, at 498.
96. Id. § 5(c).
97. Scoles & Stephens, supra note 23, at 932. This recommendation has been
adopted in this writer's proposed statute. See text accompanying note 134 infra.
98. See Powell, supra note 2, at 340.
99. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2055-56.
100. See Doetsch v. Doetsch, 312 F.2d 323, 329-30 (7th Cir. 1963) (marital de-
duction); Pitts v. Hamrick, 228 F.2d 486, 490 (4th Cir. 1955) (marital deduction).
An excellent discussion of this policy as it relates to a dissenting spouse is presented
in Kahn, supra note 58.
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ify for the deduction.110 If taxes are imposed on these interests, the
amount of the allowable deduction is correspondingly reduced, and
the amount of tax due is increased.0 2 The resulting computations
involved in a formula containing "two mutually dependent variables"
is extremely complicated. 103 Proper provisions in an apportionment stat-
ute virtually eliminate these difficulties.'0 4
F. Temporary and Remainder Interests
A difficult problem may arise when the estate tax must be paid
from a fund which is divided into both temporary and remainder in-
terests. It would be almost impossible to formulate a workable rule
that can be applied to apportion the amount of tax payable by the
two interests respectively.'0 5 Therefore a clear majority of current ap-
portionment statutes provide that the entire tax on such interests is
chargeable against the remainder interest. 0 6 It is evident that this
rule may be unfair in certain circumstances. When the remainder in-
terest is composed of assets which would qualify for a deduction, such
as those left to a qualified charity or to a surviving spouse, the interest
would pay a share of the tax even though it created none. This re-
vives the computation problems discussed previously'0 7 and is con-
trary to the general policy of an apportionment statute not to tax
assets which did not contribute to the imposition of the tax. Although
these are certainly serious considerations, "[tihere is . . . no practical
way to work the matter out." 1os As a practical matter this treatment
is the most equitable solution in many cases, for if the temporary inter-
est was burdened with a tax payment, the income beneficiaries may
receive nothing for a number of years.'09 Most writers agree that the
101. See INT. REV. Cona oF 1954, §§ 2055(c), 2056(b) (4) (A).
102. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Green, 236 N.C. 654, 658, 73 S.E.2d 879,
882 (1953); 2 N. WicuNss, supra note 33, at 1084; Kahn supra note 58, at 1500-01.
103. Lowndes, An Introduction To The Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 44 N.C.L.
REv. 1, 35 (1965); Scoles & Stephens, supra note 23, at 926-27.
104. See text accompanying note 130 infra. The non-tax producing assets problem
is discussed further in Lauritzen, supra note 11, at 85-88; Lindsay, supra note 20, at
63-64; Powell, supra note 2, at 341-42; Susman & Fourticq, supra note 80, at 1378-
79; Note, 30 IND. LJ., supra note 80, at 232-34.
105. Cf. Scoles & Stephens, supra note 23, at 933.
106. See appendix in Susman & Fourticq, supra note 80, at 1401
107. See text accompanying notes 101-04 supra.
108. UNwoum EsTATE TAx A'PORTiONmENT ACT, Commissioner's Note to § 6, su-
pra note 32, at 499.
109. See Lauritzen, supra note 11, at 85. Other discussions are found in Powell,
supra note 2, at 343-44; Note, 62 HARv. L. RFv., supra note 80, at 1027.
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solution to these problems is best left to a specific testamentary direc-
tion if a result other than that provided for by the statute is desired.110
G. Computation
The effectiveness of an estate tax apportionment statute may be
diminished if a uniform method of computation is not established.'
Although, several possible methods are available,112 a statute could
easily provide that a state official establish one formula to be applied
for all estates."13 Although apportionment may increase the com-
plexity of estate accounting, one writer has observed that "[w]hile
an annoyance, it hardly seems... this objection should be controlling
if the statute is otherwise desirable.""' 4
H. Small Bequests
Under a basic tax apportionment theory a small specific bequest,
which the testator may intend to pass to a beneficiary in full, would
be diminished by its share of the tax. To eliminate this problem the
apportionment statute could provide that any specific bequest com-
prising less than ten percent of the taxable estate would not be re-
quired to pay its share of the tax." 5 In a large estate, however, this
provision could operate as a loophole allowing a sizable bequest to
pass tax free, while increasing the amount of tax to be paid by other
beneficiaries. In addition, such a provision would merely add to the
complexities of estate accounting while solving a problem which is
really important in only a small number of estates. Once testators be-
come aware of the apportionment statute, a simple will provision can
insure the tax free passage of small bequests where that is desired.
Another problem with the tax apportionment theory is the fact
that the amount of tax levied on a recipient depends not only on the
amount he receives, but also on the total amount of the taxable estate.
The larger the estate, the higher the tax rate that each recipient must pay
on his proportionate share of the tax. Thus smaller legacies will suffer
110. See, e.g., Scoles & Stephens, supra note 23, at 928.
111. Note, 62 HAIv. L. REv., supra note 80, at 1026. The failure of an early
statute adopted in Maryland to allow for such a uniform method is credited as one
reason for its repeal. See Mitnick, supra note 80, at 328-29,
112. See Mitnick, supra note 80, at 328-29.
113. See text accompanying note 125 infra.
114. Sheffield, supra note 4, at 17.




more than larger ones."" In one case, for example, where the estate to-
taled three million dollars, a bequest of ten thousand dollars was dimin-
ished by one-third because of the estate tax allocated to it.""7 This result
is practically unavoidable, but if the basic purposes of an apportionment
statute are to prevent the complete depletion of the residuary estate
and to treat all beneficiaries as fairly as possible, the outcome is satis-
factory.118
IV. PROPOSED NORTH CAROLINA STATUTE WITH COMMENTARY
This comment has examined the problems inherent in -the present
North Carolina "burden on the residue" principle and those which could
arise under an apportionment doctrine. It is now important to detail
a statutory scheme which would eliminate most of these difficulties.
The commentary -following each provision is designed to point out
problem areas and also to provide an explanation of how present
North Carolina law would be affected. The statute is an integration
of provisions found in the Uniform Act, 19 a statute proposed by other
writers, 20 and some original contributions.
Apportionment of Federal Estate Tax
(a) Definitions.-For the purposes of this Act:
(1) "Estate" means the gross estate of a decedent as deter-
mined for the purpose of the federal estate tax.
(2) "Fiduciary" means executor, administrator of any de-
scription, and trustee.
(3) "Person" means any individual, partnership, associa-
tion, joint stock company, corporation, governmental agency, in-
cluding any multiples or combinations of the foregoing as, for ex-
ample, individuals as joint tenants.
(5) "State" means any state, territory, or possession of the
United States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico.
(6) "Tax" means the Federal Estate Tax, and interest and
penalties imposed in addition to -the tax.
116. See Mitnick, supra note 80, at 330; Comment, 41 U. CN. L. RV. supra
70, at 911.
117. In re Mollenhauer's Will, 257 App. Div. 286, 13 N.Y.S.2d 619 (1939).
118. See Mitnick, supra note 80, at 330 n.196.
119. UNIFORM ESTATh TAX APPORTiONmENT AcT, supra note 32, at 491-502.
120. See Susman & Fourticq, supra note 80, at 1382-99.
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Commentary
This is a basic definitional provision specifically delineating cer-
tain terms used throughout the Act. It should be noted that in (6),
"tax" is meant to include only the federal estate tax. Although sev-
eral states have included their own death taxes in an apportionment
act,1 ' the entire structure of the North Carolina inheritance tax
would have to be re-shaped to fit into an apportionment system. Al-
though uniform treatment for both state and federal death taxes seems
desirable, the General Assembly should not adopt this approach with-
out carefully considering the long history of its own statutory system.
For that reason this statute is designed solely to remedy the effects of
the "burden on the residue" rule applicable to the federal estate tax.
"Tax" is defined to include interest and penalties. This was
done to avoid the problems existing under early statutes which were
silent on this point. 2 -
(b) Apportionment
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the tax shall
be apportioned among all the persons interested in the estate.
The apportionment shall be made in the proportion that the value
of the interest of each person interested in the estate bears to the
total value of the interests of all persons interested in the estate.
The values as finally determined for federal estate tax purposes
shall be used for the purposes of this computation. The method
of computation shall be determined by (appropriate state tax offi-
cial) and it shall be applied uniformly to all estates.
(2) The provisions of this act shall not apply where and
to the extent that a testator provides otherwise in his will, or where
in any other instrument direction to the contrary is provided for
taxes assessed upon the specific fund dealt with in such instru-
ment. Such contrary provision in a will shall be effective to pre-
empt the application of this Act as to both probate and non-pro-
bate assets unless provided otherwise.
Commentary
This is the basic apportionment provision, and it is made applic-
able to both probate and non-probate assets.123 The formula is the
121. Id. at 1400.
122. See text accompanying notes 89-93 supra.
123. This would statutorily overrule the tax allocation position established in Buf-
faloe v. Barnes, 226 N.C. 313, 38 S.E.2d 222 (1946), and would establish a uniform
rule for all assets.
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same as that used by the Internal Revenue Code for apportioning
taxes imposed on insurance proceeds and powers of appointment, so
there should be no conflict with the provisions. 12 4 The provision ex-
pressly placing the responsibility for formulating a uniform method of
computation on a state tax olficial is designed to prevent uncertainty
as to the proper accounting method to be used.125
Subsection (2) is intended to preserve the decedent's actual in-
tentions on where the tax burden should fall. In addition to a con-
trary will provision, the statute also permits a decedent to alter its ap-
plication by the inclusion of a clause in any inter vivos instrument.
This clause affects, by its terms, only the assets covered by the instru-
ment. This alternative solves several problems inherent in the Uni-
form Act which allows contrary direction by will only.126 It also pro-
vides a better possibility that the decedent's actual intentions will be
preserved.
The last sentence of subsection (2) is designed to avoid the pos-
sibility that North Carolina will adopt the New York approach as to
what type of will direction is required to prevent apportionment
against non-probate assets.'27  A tax clause placing the burden of
"my estate and inheritance taxes" upon the residue is surely meant to
include those taxes due from all assets. This statutory provision is de-
signed to achieve that result. Of course, the testator is free to limit this
direction to either probate or non-probate assets.
It would be impossible to draft a statute defining what types of
will provisions would be effective to overcome the effects of the stat-
ute-that problem must be left to the courts.
(c) Procedure for Determining Apportionment
(1) The Clerk of Superior Court having jurisdiction over
the administration of the testate or intestate portion of the estate
of a decedent shall determine the apportionment of the tax upon
the application of any person interested in the estate. If there
are no probate proceedings, the Clerk of the Superior Court of
the county wherein the decedent was domiciled at death shall de-
termine the apportionment of the tax upon the application of the
person required to pay the tax.
(2) If the Clerk finds that it is inequitable to apportion in-
124. See note 27 supra.
125. See text accompanying notes 111-14 supra.
126. See Scoles & Stepbens, supra note 23, at 919-22.
127. See text accompanying notes 77-79 supra.
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terest and penalties in the manner provided in this Act because
of special circumstances, he may direct apportionment thereon in
the manner he finds equitable.
(3) The expenses reasonably incurred by any fiduciary and
by any other person interested in the estate in connection with
the determination of the amount and apportionment of the tax
shall be apportioned as provided for taxes under this Act. If the
Clerk finds that it is inequitable to apportion the expenses as pro-
vided, he may direct other more equitable apportionment.
(4) Any amount of tax which cannot be collected from any
person shall be apportioned among all the other persons interested
in the estate whose interests are subject to apportionment.
Commentary
Subsection (1) is intended to incorporate the apportionment de-
termination into the normal procedure for administering estates in
North Carolina.' 28  This will enable the neW system to be imple-
mented without the unnecessary creation of a special administrative
agency or judicial officer.
Subsection (2) authorizes the clerk of Superior Court to alter the
normal apportionment of interest and penalties in a situation where
apportionment would be inequitable. If interest or penalties are im-
posed due to the fault of one or more persons interested in the estate
or a fiduciary, the Clerk is free to place the burden on them.12
Subsection (3) extends the basic apportionment concept to any ex-
penses incurred in determining the amount of tax and what each person
should pay. As with interest and penalties, the Clerk has the discre-
tion to apportion expenses in any manner he feels is equitable.
Subsection (4) makes it clear that in any case where a person's
share of the tax cannot be collected, it will be apportioned among the
other recipients.
(d) Exemptions, Deductions, and Credits
(1) Any interest for which a deduction or exemption is al-
lowable under the federal revenue laws in determining the value
of the decedent's net taxable estate, such as property passing to
or in trust for a surviving spouse and gifts or bequests for char-
itable, public, or similar purposes, shall not be included in the
128. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-1 (1966) makes the Clerk of Superior Court respon-
sible for estate administration.
129. See text accompanying notes 89-91 supra.
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computation provided for in section (b) of this Act to the extent
of the allowable deduction or exemption. To that extent no ap-
portionment shall be made against such interest (except that when
such an interest is subject to a prior present interest which is not
allowable as a deduction or exemption, the estate tax apportion-
able against the present interest shall be paid from principal.
(2) Any credit for property previously taxed and any credit
for gift taxes or death taxes of a foreign country paid by the dece-
dent or his estate inures to the proportionate benefit of all persons
liable to apportionment. Provided, however, that if the tax which
gives rise to such a credit has in fact been paid by a person in-
terested in the estate, the benefit of such credit shall inure to that
person paying the tax.
(3) Any credit for inheritance, succession, or estate taxes
or taxes in the nature thereof in respect to property or interests
includable in the estate inures to the benefit -of the persons or
interests chargeable with the payment thereof to the extent that,
or in the proportion that, the credit reduces the tax.
(4) To the extent that property passing to or in trust for
a surviving spouse or any charitable, public, or similar gift or be-
quest does not constitute an allowable deduction for purposes of
the tax solely by reason of an inheritance tax or other death tax
imposed upon and deductible from the property, the property shall
not be included in the computation provided for in this Act, and
to that extent no apportionment shall be made against the prop-
erty. This section does not apply in any instance where the result
will be to deprive the estate of a deduction otherwise allowable
under section 2053(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 of
the United States, relating to deduction for state death taxes on
transfers for public, charitable, or religious uses.
Commentary
Subsection (1) is intended to preserve the idea that property not
contributing to the tax should not be made to pay it. Thus, to the ex-
tent property qualifies for the marital or charitable deduction, it is
omitted from the apportionment formula. This will avoid most compu-
tation problems inherent in these situations.130 This section will
overcome the holding in Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Green' and
will expand the proviso in section 30-3 (a) of the General Statutes 8 .
to include all marital deduction situations. Therefore the proviso in
130. See text accompanying notes 101-03 supra.
131. 236 N.C. 654, 73 S.E.2d 879 (1953).
132. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3(a) (Supp. 1973).
1974] 759
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
section 30-3 (a) should be ommitted since it would be surplus. The
exception for a future interest may be harsh in some situations, but
any other method would involve immense computation problems.' 83
The testator can always provide for this problem in his will or inter
vivos instrument.
Subsection (2) provides for credits allowed to the estate for gift
and foreign death taxes that have been paid. They will benefit all
the recipients unless one or more has actually paid the tax, and in
that situation the benefit of the credit should inure to him.'1 4
Subsection (3) makes any credit allowed as a result of payment
of state death taxes"3 5 inure to the benefit of those persons responsi-
ble for their payment.
Subsection (4), found in the Uniform Act, has been called "the
most controversial part of the Act."' 86 It is designed to allow the full
advantage of a marital or charitable deduction in cases where the
beneficiaries of a deductible devise or bequest would ordinarily be
made to pay a part of the state death tax, thus reducing the amount
actually allowed as a deduction, and thereby making that amount li-
able for payment of federal taxes.'1 7  The exception contained in the
last sentence is to insure the estate does not lose a deduction available
under section 2053(d).88
(e) Temporary and Remainder Interests
No interest in income and no estate for years or for life or
other temporary interest in any property or fund is subject to ap-
133. Scoles & Stephens, supra note 23, at 927-28; see text accompanying notes 107-
10 supra.
134. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
135. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2011.
136. Scoles & Stephens, supra note 23, at 928.
137. UNwoRm EsTATE TAX APPORTIONMENT ACT, Commissioner's Note to § 5, clu-
pra note 32, at 499 states:
[This] subsection ... relates to a complicated portion of the Federal
estate tax law concerning the marital deduction and charitable deductions.
For the marital deduction, the problem with which the Section deals may be
illustrated by the following: If a husband's will bequeaths half of his estate
of $200,000 to his wife, under ordinary circumstances $100,000 would be de-
ductible from the gross estate as a marital deduction. If, however, a state
should assess an inheritance tax of $10,000 against the bequest of the widow,
$90,000 only would be deductible and $10,000 would be included in the gross
estate and taxed. [The] Subsection . .. provides that in such an instance
no apportionment is made against the $10,000 of the widow's bequest, which
was deducted in computing the Federal estate tax. The matter is ignored.
The same is true as to transfers to exempt charitable institutions.
See Scoles & Stephens, supra note 23, at 929.
138. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2053(d). The workings of this section are dis-
cussed in Scoles & Stephens, supra note 23, at 929.
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portionment as between the temporary interest and the remainder.
The tax on the temporary interest and the tax, if any, on the re-
mainder is chargeable against the corpus of the property or funds
subject to the temporary interest and remainder.
Commentary
The reasons for this provision have been discussed previously. 139
(f) Fiduciary's Rights and Duties
(1) The fiduciary or other person required to pay the tax
may withhold from any property of the decedent in his possession,
distributable to any person interested in the estate, the amount
of the tax attributable to his interest. If the property in posses-
sion of the fiduciary or other person required to pay the tax and
distributable to any person interested in the estate is insufficient
to satisfy the proportionate amount of the tax determined to be
due from the person, the fiduciary or other person required to pay
,the tax may recover the deficiency from the person interested in
the estate. If the property is not in the possession of the fiduciary
or other person required to pay -the tax he may recover from any
person interested in the estate the amount of the tax apportioned
to the person in accordance with this Act.
(2) If property held by the fiduciary or other person is dis-
tributed prior to final apportionment of the tax, the fiduciary or
other person may require the distributee to provide a bond or
other security for the apportionment liability in the form and
amount prescribed by the fiduciary, with the approval of the Clerk
of Superior Court having jurisdiction of the administration of the
estate.
Commentary
This section describes the actual method by which the tax may
be collected and the property distributed. To avoid any undue delay
in distribution, the property may be released by the fiduciary or other
person upon the posting of security adequate to pay the tax.
(g) Effective Date
The provisions of this Act shall not apply to taxes due on
account of the death of decedents dying prior to
(six months after enactment).
139. See text accompanying notes 105-09 supra.
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Commentary
This provision is designed to eliminate any possible problems with
retroactive application. 140  Of course, realistically speaking, the Act will
be "retroactive" as to instruments drawn before its enactment which
control the estate of a decedent whose death comes after the effective
date of the Act. It cannot be assumed that every testator will have his
will revised to get the maximum effectiveness from the statutory ap-
portionment. However, most carefully prepared wills contain a tax
clause which will operate to effect the testator's intentions regardless
of the status of state law. The statute is basically intended to bring
about a more equitable result in cases where no careful tax planning
was done. The six months delay will enable those persons who pur-
posely relied on North Carolina's "burden on the residue" rule and
left their wills silent as to tax payment to specifically include a tax
clause in their wills requiring the residuary estate to bear the entire
tax burden if they wish to avoid apportionment. 141
CONCLUSION
North Carolina's present alpproach to the allocation of the fed-
eral estate tax, the "burden on the residue" rule, is fraught with un-
desirable consequences. If the decedent fails to provide properly for
the tax consequences, his entire testamentary plan may be upset. In
most instances it is the decedent's closest relatives who will suffer. In
addition, compelling the surviving spouse or a charitable recipient to
contribute part of the tax diminishes the amount otherwise qualifying
for a deduction, and the amount of tax levied on the entire estate is
therefore increased.
Although the apportionment doctrine is not without its own prob-
lems, in the majority of situations it will provide an equitable result.
It is hoped that the General Assembly will seriously consider the adoP-
tion of a statute similar to the one proposed in order to provide North
Carolina estate recipients with the benefits currently enjoyed by per-
sons in a majority of other states.
ROBERT LEE WATT Ml
140. These problems are discussed in Mitnick, supra note 80, at 302-07; S.chiaroli,
Apportionment of Federal and State Estate Taxes in Connecticut, 20 CoNN. B.. 198,
203-06 (1946); Note, Virginia Statute on Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes, 34
U. VA. L. Rlv. 370, 372-75 (1948).
141. Cf. Note, 34 U. PA. L. REV. supra note 140, at 373.
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